SPF, DKIM, and DMARC stop attackers from sending email that claims to come from your exact domain. They do nothing to stop an attacker from registering a domain that looks like yours and sending from that instead. A lookalike domain can have perfectly valid SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records of its own, and its email will pass every authentication check.
Email authentication is essential. It’s just not the whole answer.
What each protocol actually does
- SPF publishes which mail servers are allowed to send for your domain. Receiving servers check whether a message came from one of them.
- DKIM adds a cryptographic signature to your outgoing mail, so receivers can verify the message came from your domain and wasn’t altered in transit.
- DMARC ties the two together. It checks that the domain in the visible “From” address matches a domain that passed SPF or DKIM, and tells receivers what to do when it doesn’t: nothing (
p=none), send to spam (p=quarantine), or block (p=reject). It also sends you reports on who is sending as your domain.
Together, with DMARC at enforcement, these stop direct spoofing of acme.com. That matters, and large mailbox providers such as Google and Yahoo now require DMARC for bulk senders. More on all three in our glossary entry.
The gap: authentication proves who sent it, not who they are
Every one of these checks answers the question “did this message really come from the domain it says?” None of them answers “is that domain the company the reader thinks it is?”
Suppose an attacker registers acme-payments.com, sets up SPF, signs with DKIM, and publishes a DMARC record. A message from billing@acme-payments.com passes all three. To the receiving server it is legitimate mail from a legitimate domain. To your vendor’s accounts payable clerk, it looks like you.
The same is true for:
- Typosquats like
acmme.com - Homoglyphs that swap a letter for an identical-looking character from another alphabet
- Alternate extensions like
acme.co - Display-name tricks, where the sender name says “Acme Finance” but the address is a free webmail account
And because the attack targets your customers and vendors, it often never touches your mail servers at all, so your own DMARC reports won’t show it.
What closes the gap
- Get DMARC to enforcement on every domain you own, including domains that don’t send mail. Parked domains should publish a reject policy so they can’t be spoofed either.
- Monitor for lookalike domains. Watch newly registered domains and certificate transparency logs for names that resemble yours, so you find
acme-payments.comwhile it’s being set up, not after the invoice is paid. - Block what you find. Add confirmed lookalikes to your email gateway and DNS filter, and pursue takedowns where you can.
- Use email security that looks at intent, not just authentication. Impersonation detection flags messages from look-alike senders, first-time senders claiming to be known vendors, and payment requests that don’t fit normal patterns.
- Verify payment changes out of band. A phone call to a known number beats any filter for bank-detail changes.
How FirmGuardian helps
FirmGuardian covers the gap from both sides. The FirmGuardian platform finds lookalike domains registered against your brand, scored and enriched so you can block them early. Email & Workspace Protection, built on Check Point Harmony and operated by our team, catches the impersonation and BEC attempts that pass authentication checks.
Related reading: Business email compromise and How lookalike domains attack your business.
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